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ABSTRACT 
The experiences of submarine warfare from WWI and WWII have generally 
dictated maximum speed when designing conventional submarines. Technological 
development of submarine and antisubmarine weapons, however, requires examination of 
submarine warfare and tactics. This thesis focuses on a coastal conventional submarine's 
ability to survive, as a function of its maximum speed, when attacked by a light 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedo. It also evaluates the maximum speed with which 
the submarine should be equipped to ensure a specified probability of survival. The 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the probability that the submarine, operating up to 
maximum speed and launching only one set of countermeasures, is not caught by the 
torpedo. 
The investigation builds on a discrete event simulation model. The systems 
simulated are a submarine, a light ASW torpedo, and a countermeasure system consisting 
of one decoy and four jammers. The results show that maximum speed of a submarine 
does effect the submarine's evasive performance between 12 and 18 knots. The 
simulated model reached a maximum probability of survival at 18 knots. That result 
should be regarded as a minimum since a real life system might require a higher 
maximum speed to reach its greatest probability of survival. 
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EXECUTIVES~RY 
The demand for a high maximum speed when designing conventional submarines 
has primarily been dictated by the experiences of submarine warfare from WWI and 
WWll. Until recently this maximum speed criterion has seldom been questioned. 
Meanwhile, the technological development of submarine and antisubmarine weapons has 
required many changes in submarine warfare and tactics. These developments should 
also influence the demands on future submarine designs, and in particular may influence 
maximum submerged speed requirements. 
This thesis investigates the relationship between the maximum submerged speed 
of a conventional coastal submarine equipped with a torpedo countermeasure system and 
the evasive capability of the submarine. In particular the thesis focuses on the 
submarine's ability to survive, as a function of its maximum speed, when attacked by a 
light antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedo. The thesis also evaluates the maximum 
speed with which a conventional submarine should be equipped to ensure a specified 
probability of survival while evading a light ASW torpedo. The measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) used in this thesis is the probability that the submarine, operating up to maximum 
speed and launching only one set of countermeasures, is not caught by the torpedo. 
The investigation builds on a discrete event simulation model. The model 
involves the movements of the systems, the detection of targets, the logic behind the 
decision of attack mode or search mode for the torpedo, and the logic for execution of the 
evasive actions by the submarine. The systems that are simulated are a submarine, a light 
ASW torpedo, and a countermeasure system consisting of one decoy and four jammers. 
The weapons systems are based on unclassified data from open sources. 
The high-speed torpedo starts its circular search for the submarine, when dropped 
from a ship or an aircraft. The submarine immediately executes its evasive actions after 
detecting the torpedo. These actions involve evasive maneuvering and deployment of 
countermeasure systems. The four jammers form an acoustic shield around the 
submarine meant to break the initial contact of the torpedo. While the decoy, which has a 
speed-of 17 knots, seduces the torpedo to follow. Simultaneously the submarine turns 
away from the decoy and starts accelerating to its maximum speed. 
ix 
Since the intention is to evaluate the submarine's maximum speed, the submarine 
is not allowed to launch a new set of countermeasures, but depends on its speed to escape 
the torpedo. The torpedo has a short endurance and may run out of power before it 
catches the submarine. If so, the submarine escapes and survives; if not, it is killed. The 
maximum speed is the independent variable of the experiments, and the probability of 
survival is measured for each maximum speed. 
The results of this thesis show that maximum speed of a submarine does have an 
effect on the submarine's evasive performance within a specific range of speed. For the 
simulated model, that range is between 12 and 18 knots. The simulated model reached a 
maximum probability of survival at 18 knots. That result should be regarded as a 
minimum since a real life system might require a higher maximum speed to reach its 
greatest probability of survival. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE NEED FOR SPEED 
The main features of the submarine have always been its capabilities to dive and 
to conduct attacks with powerful torpedoes from a hidden submerged position. Speed 
and mobility have also characterized the submarine throughout its history. Prior to the 
end of WWII, the submarine was by and large a surface going torpedo boat designed to 
dive, then stay submerged until the tactical situation allowed it to surface again. When 
submerged, it was powered by batteries, which had to be recharged by the submarine's 
diesel engines and generators when the ship returned to the surface. Thus, most WWII-
era submarines were designed with a high surface speed (15-19 knots), when the diesel 
engines provided the energy, and a much lower submerged speed (seven to nine knots), 
when the battery capacity was the limiting constraint. These capabilities were also 
reflected in the design of the hull, a V -shaped bow allowing high surface speed. The 
need to surface in order to charge the batteries or to run with high speed to intercept 
targets made the submarine vulnerable to attacks. 
When the snorkel mast was introduced in the latter part of WWII, the submarine 
could charge its batteries while submerged. Because the submarine did not have to 
surface while charging, it was designed to run at a higher submerged speed to make better 
tactical use of its submerged state. The German Type XXI, which entered production in 
1944, was designed with a maximum submerged speed of 17.18 knots. (Miller, 1991, 
p.78). Conventional submarine designs since WWII have had high maximum submerged 
speed. 
The demand for high maximum speed in post-WWII conventional submarines has 
primarily been dictated by the experiences of WWI and WWII. Current speed 
maximums range from 16 to 24 knots with design and technology constraints limiting the 
upper range. 
Following World War II and up until the last couple of decades, few changes have 
been made to the design of submarines and the weapons used to attack them. Whether 
attacking surface ships or evading antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms, high speed 
has generally been crucial for the submarine to succeed in its mission. The general 
scenario determining a specific top speed for a submarine was as follows: 
To carry out an attack, the submarine first penetrated the screen of escorts around 
the target and then moved into a firing position. This position normally provided a 
torpedo track of between 1,000 and 3,000 meters. To reach a firing position, the 
submarine often needed to use its maximum speed to sprint into a favorable position 
close to the target's course line or mean line of approach (Ml..A). Thus the submarine's 
required maximum speed had to exceed the target's speed, which was approximately 15 
knots for a convoy. After the attack, the submarine again had to use high speed to clear 
the datum (the last known position the enemy had on the submarine) it had just created 
and to evade the antisubmarine escorts. Because of flow noise around the hull, the 
performance of the surface ship's search-and-attack sonar was severely degraded when 
the ship's speed exceeded 15 to 16 knots. 
Today, technological developments of submarine and antisubmarine warfare have 
changed the situation. The submarine's modem anti-surface warfare (ASuW) torpedoes 
are both wire-guided and homing, and they have increased tactical range of 15,000 
meters or more. This increased torpedo range relaxes the former demand for the 
submarine to quickly achieve a firing position close to the target's track, so high speed in 
this phase of the attack is no longer needed. 
The threat against the submarine has also changed in nature. During an attack on 
an escorted target, the main threat used to be the first generations of ASW torpedoes or 
depth charges either dropped directly from the escorts or mortared out to a specific range 
from the ship. Today the most dangerous threat to a submarine, both during an attack and 
in other situations, is a modem light torpedo dropped from a ship's helicopters or from 
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). 
The light ASW torpedo is a sophisticated weapon that homes in on the submarine 
with a high speed of between 32 and 50 knots. A conventional submarine is not able to 
outrun a torpedo dropped within some range close to it. The submarine, however, might 
make use of its stealth capacities to avoid detection from the torpedo's sonar or, if 
detected, to try to break contact by different countermeasures and clear the datum by 
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sprinting away. A light torpedo normally has short endurance. By the time it manages to 
regain contact, the submarine could be out of its range. Thus, the submarine needs to 
have a maximum speed high enough to open the distance from the last datum held by the 
searching torpedo so that the torpedo is unable to catch the submarine. 
Both in the development of staff requirements for new submarine designs and in 
the evolution of evasive tactics, it is of great interest in the submarine community to 
determine the consequences of the submarine's maximum speed on its evasive 
capabilities. This thesis addresses maximum speed and its impact on modem submarine 
design. 
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
1. Problem Statement 
The questions addressed by this thesis concern the evasive performance and 
maximum speed of a conventional submarine equipped with a torpedo countermeasure 
system when attacked by a modem light ASW torpedo dropped by an aircraft. 
Specifically: 
• What is the effect of a conventional submarine's maximum speed on its 
evasive performance when attacked by a modem light ASW torpedo? 
• What should be the maximum speed of a conventional coastal submarine 
equipped with a torpedo countermeasure system to ensure a specified 
probability of survival while evading a light ASW torpedo? 
2. Methodology 
To define this problem properly, it is necessary to describe the capabilities and 
performance limits of conventional submarines and light ASW torpedoes, and of the 
possible torpedo-countermeasure systems. It is also important to understand the evasive 
actions taken by a submarine, and the operating scenario for the submarine, torpedoes, 
and countermeasure systems. The following paragraphs discuss evasive actions and 
operating scenarios, while the next section provides an overview of the systems. 
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Evasive actions taken by a submarine consist of the following phases or elements 
in sequential order: 
• Avoid detection. In this phase the submarine takes advantage of its low 
signatures (both its self-generated noise radiation and its target echo 
strength), and the oceanographic conditions in order to remain undetected. 
• Break contact. If detected it is necessary to take evasive actions to break 
the contact. This can be done by change of speed, course, or depth, or by 
deploying some sort of torpedo countermeasure device. Most often a 
combination of these actions is carried out. The countermeasures can be 
decoys that transmit the same sonar pulses as those transmitted from the 
torpedo, or simply just air bubbles released by the submarine. The 
countermeasures can also be powerful noise generators made to screen the 
submarine from the torpedo. 
• Clear the datum. If the submarine is successful in breaking the contact, it 
is of importance to clear its position last known to the enemy. 
These evasive phases are the same whether dodging a delivery platform or an incoming 
torpedo. This thesis considers only situations in which the submarine evades a light 
torpedo. 
The geometry of this scenario is different in each case. The scenario depends on 
the initial distance between the submarine and the torpedo, and the relative bearing of the 
torpedo to the submarine. Other variables are the relative courses of the countermeasure 
devices deployed from the submarine. 
This thesis focuses on the probability that the submarine escapes the torpedo. 
That is the probability that it manages to run into a safe position by diverting the torpedo 
with its deployed countermeasures and using its high speed. A safe position is one where 
the torpedo can no longer reach the submarine because of the torpedo's limited 
endurance. This thesis focuses on the submarine's speed required to achieve a safe 
position, and does not evaluate the more complex total probability of submarine survival, 
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which is a function of the torpedo's probability of hit (P(hit)) and probability of inflicting 
mortal damage given it hits (P(mortal damage)). 
3. General System Descriptions 
a. Description of a Conventional Submarine 
The small conventional submarine (known by the designator SSC) has a 
displacement of approximately 500-1,500 tons and is mainly designed for coastal 
operations. It can also carry out blue water operations (for which the large ocean going 
conventional submarine (known by the designator SSK) is designed) within its range and 
endurance limits. 1 The small size benefits its acoustic target echo strength (TES) 
signature, which tends to be lower than the TES of SSKs and nuclear attack submarines. 
Conventional submarines have maximum submerged speeds of 16 to 24 
knots, and very low acoustic signatures. Their maximum speed is much lower than that 
of nuclear-propelled submarines. They also have very short endurance at maximum 
speed. Endurance depends on the battery capacity when the top speed run starts. Quite 
often the submarine is unable to maintain top speed for more than 15 to 30 minutes. 
Conventional submarines are equipped with a diesel electrical propulsion 
system consisting of a main electrical motor that turns the propeller shaft. The electrical 
motor is powered by the battery package, which occupies a considerable amount of space 
onboard. The batteries are charged by generators powered by the diesel engines, which 
again can be run while submerged at periscope depth (PD) by the use of a snorkel mast. 
New submarine designs also plan the installation of an air independent propulsion system 
which, without restricting the submarine's operating depth, can charge the batteries 
without snorkeling. This new system would be capable of instantaneously providing the 
main electrical motor with the power needed for lower speeds. Such a design would help 
the submarine maintain a high battery capacity at any time, improving the endurance of a 
maximum speed run. 
1 A small conventional submarine designed to operate in coastal waters is normally given the designator 
SSe, while larger conventional submarines designed to operate in open ocean (blue water) is a SSK. These 
designations are related to the range and endurance of the two categories of submarines, where the SSK has 
the longest range and longest endurance of the two. These designations are also related to the capabilities 
of the submarines. The SSK often has better ASW capability than the SSe, while the SSe might certainly 
be ASW capable but is mainly both designed for and tasked to execute ASuW operations. 
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Because of the small size of these submarines, conventional submarines 
have limited space for torpedo storage. The submarines in some cases may not be 
equipped with a torpedo storage room at all, instead carrying all their torpedoes in the 
torpedo tubes. 
Because of the submarine's design restrictions, high submerged speed is a 
costly demand. The maximum speed is one of the elements that drives the design of a 
submarine. It affects the size and numbers of batteries, which may possibly increase the 
size of the submarine or take up valuable interior space. The batteries in tum affect the 
size of the diesel engines, the generators, and the snorkel system. The maximum speed 
also affects the size of the electrical propulsion motor. Since size of a submarine has a 
negative impact on its target echo strength (TES) signature, a larger submarine is in 
general less stealthy than a smaller one. 
The main task of the SSC is anti-surface warfare (ASuW). With long-
range torpedoes, the submarine can carry out an attack on surface ships from distances 
well outside the surface ships' weapon ranges, except when the surface ships carry 
organic ASW helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. 
b. Description of a Light ASW Torpedo 
Modem light ASW torpedoes have a high speed of 32 to 50 knots, a fairly 
small warhead with approximately 30 to 50 kilograms of high explosives, and an engine 
compartment designed to attain high speed quickly and to maintain the speed for only six 
to ten minutes. The torpedo is normally equipped with a high frequency sonar with low 
power, limiting its range to 700 to 2,000 meters. 
c. Description of a Torpedo Countermeasure System 
There are a number of expendable torpedo countermeasure systems 
available on the market today. Most systems consist of one decoy launched from the 
submarine's signal ejector. The decoys are designed to seduce the incoming torpedo and 
cause it to break contact with the submarine. Once launched, the decoy operates 
independently of the launch platform and holds station at its launched depth or at a pre-
selected depth. There are also similar systems that consist of a large self-propelled decoy 
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launched from the submarine's torpedo tubes (e.g., Russian MG-74ME). This is a 
sophisticated system, but has the disadvantage that it occupies a torpedo tube and 
displaces a torpedo. 
More sophisticated systems consist of several units that are launched. One 
or more of these are decoys while the others are jammers, whose role is to screen the 
radiated noise from the submarine as well as the submarine's echo from the torpedo's 
active sonar. The decoy units may also be self-propelled and move away from the 
submarine. These systems are launched from canisters outside of the submarine's 
pressure hull, considerably decreasing the reaction time. 
Some of these systems are automatically launched when the submarine's 
torpedo warning system detects a torpedo. Other systems require the order from the 
submarine's Commanding Officer (CO) or from the Officer on Watch. 
This chapter described the historical need for high maximum speed. 
Based on the development of ASW and ASuW, both weapons and tactics, this chapter 
sets up the questions of the development of the submarine design of today, and in 
particular the demand for speed. This chapter described the weapon systems that are of 
interest in general. The next chapter describes these weapon systems in detail as they are 
used in this thesis. 
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II.' DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENARIO 
This chapter describes the measure of effectiveness to be used, the scenario of 
interest, the three different weapon systems, and how they interact in this scenario. The 
three main weapon systems, the submarine, the torpedo, and the torpedo countermeasure 
system, are all generic systems. This thesis does not contain any classified information. 
The scenario consists of one submarine and an incoming light torpedo dropped at 
a position randomly chosen within a radius of 2000 meters and within a relative bearing 
between 0 and 360 degrees from the submarine. When the submarine detects the torpedo, 
it conducts a preset evasive maneuver after a given time delay, and launches the 
countermeasure system, consisting of one decoy and four jammers. The countermeasure 
units are self-propelled. The decoy moves away from the submarine, while the 
noisemakers deploy in a pattern around the submarine to shield it from the torpedo's 
sonar. 
This chapter develops the measure of effectiveness (MOE) which is then used to 
evaluate the behavior of the weapon systems and their interactions under various 
scenarios. The MOEs are developed with respect to the problem statement (ref Chapter 
I) which emphasizes the evasive performance of the submarine as a function of its 
maximum speed. After describing the measures of effectiveness used, this chapter 
describes the systems and the geometry of the scenario in more detail. 
A. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the probability that the 
submarine, operating up to maximum speed and launching only one set of 
countermeasures, is not caught by the incoming torpedo. Perhaps the submarine manages 
to outrun the attaching torpedo, and the torpedo thereafter runs out of power before it can 
catch up with the submarine. The submarine might also be able to get outside the 
torpedo's detection range before the torpedo finishes investigating the decoy. In these 
cases the survival of the submarine is a function of the synergy between the 
countermeasure system and the evasive run of the submarine, where the maximum speed 
of the submarine is the only independent variable of the trials. 
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This MOE is chosen to ensure that the submarine's maximum speed is evaluated, 
not the effectiveness of the submarine's torpedo countermeasure system or the 
effectiveness of the torpedo. If, for instance, the submarine launches several sets of 
countermeasure systems, it might manage to keep the torpedo at a safe distance without 
the use of speed at all. In these cases, it is not the performance of the submarine that is 
measured but rather that of the countermeasure system. 
Another MOE that could be considered is the probability that the submarine is 
killed by the incoming torpedo. This MOE is quite complicated and involves other 
variables not necessarily related to the speed of the submarine, such as the effectiveness 
of the torpedo's warhead. Consequently, this thesis will use the first MOE. 
Although the MOE focuses on the catch or the escape of the submarine, there 
might be reference to the kill or the survival of the submarine in this thesis. The 
probabilities of kill or survival are understood as the probabilities of catch or escape of 
the submarine. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEMS 
This section contains a detailed description of each of the weapon systems and 
their subsystems. It also describes the geometry of the scenario, and how each system 
interacts in detail. 
This is an unclassified thesis, and all warfare systems used are generic. They are 
built on existing systems though, with data from open sources like Jane's Fighting Ships 
or Jane's Underwater Waifare Systems. These data are primarily performance 
characteristics such as speed and range, and have not provided information of the 
systems' performance and actions taken in the scenario of interest. In cases where the 
action or reaction performed by each of the systems is of importance for the scenario and 
the model, the characteristics have been developed for the purpose of this work. The 
performance characteristics are described in more detail later in this chapter. Note that 
the actions taken in similar situations by existing systems might be different than the 
actions taken by the generic systems of this thesis. 
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1. The Torpedo 
The torpedo used in this model is a lightweight anti-submarine torpedo, which can 
be fired from either a surface ship or from a helicopter or maritime patrol aircraft (MP A). 
The torpedo has standard dimensions for lightweight torpedoes; it is 2.6 meters long with 
a diameter of 0.32 meters. It has a speed of 40 kt (20.58 meter per second) and a tum-
radius of 65 meters. Its endurance is eight minutes. By comparison the British-produced 
. Sting Ray torpedo has a speed of 45 kt and the US-produced Mk 46 a speed of 40 kt. The 
endurance for both of these two torpedoes is approximately 8 minutes (Jane's 
Underwater Waifare Systems, pp. 248,249,251, 252). A tum-radius of 65 meters is 
assumed. The torpedo is equipped with a search and attack sonar with an effective 
detection range of 1500 meters. The sonar has a search sector of 45 degrees to each side 
of the torpedo's centerline. 
The torpedo is dropped within 1500 meters from its target, the submarine. It is 
preset to search in a circle until it makes contact with a target, either a submarine or a 
decoy. In the worst case the torpedo might not make contact at all, and circles in this 
position until the end of its life. In most cases in this study though, the torpedo makes 
contact with either the submarine or the decoy. 
The torpedo chooses the target that has the highest acoustic target strength (TES) 
and attacks it. If the chosen target is the decoy, the torpedo at some point reclassifies its 
target as a non-submarine because its warhead does not receive the expected ignition 
criteria. (Either the torpedo senses the lack of an expected magnetic signature from its 
target, or misses the expected force of an impact.) Some torpedoes may detonate when 
hitting a decoy, but that is not a situation considered in this thesis. If the decoy starts the 
ignition process in the torpedo, the model would not measure the performance of the 
submarine and the value of its maximum speed, but the efficiency of the countermeasure 
system instead. The countermeasure system's role is to seduce the torpedo and screen the 
submarine so that the submarine can clear the datum by the use of its speed before the 
torpedo starts chasing it. 
When the torpedo has reclassified the decoy correctly, it either starts running after 
the submarine, if it is in contact, or performs a new search by going into circles. It is thus 
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capable of searching the area behind it again, which it passed while it had locked on and 
chased the decoy. If the submarine now is outside the protection given by the 
noisemakers and still within the range of the torpedo's sensor, the torpedo should be able 
to gain contact, and this time attack its proper target. It is now a race between the 
relatively slow submarine and the much faster torpedo. At this moment when the torpedo 
starts its final chase, it is only the distance between the two and the remaining endurance 
of the torpedo that determine the outcome of the game. 
2. The Submarine 
The submarine is a small conventional submarine, designed for operations in 
coastal and shallow waters. It has a displacement of 1000 tons, a tum-radius of 120 
meters and an acceleration of 0.05 meters per second squared. The maximum speed of 
the submarine is the independent variable in this model and has been varied between 12 
and 24 kt. The submarine is equipped with passive search sonars and a sonar-warning 
system designed to detect active sonar emissions from other platforms. The submarine 
can, with these sensors, theoretically detect an active sonar at twice the distance as the 
active sonar from the torpedo can detect the submarine. 
When a torpedo is detected, the submarine begins a set of evasive actions. It 
deploys the decoy and a pair of jammers, and then start its evasive maneuver. To get as 
far away from the decoy as possible it starts accelerating to maximum speed, and turns 
towards a course approximately reciprocal to the decoy's course. 
3. The Torpedo Countermeasure System 
The torpedo countermeasure system in this model consists of one decoy and four 
jammers placed outside of the submarine's pressure hull (for instance in the casing or in 
the sail). This generic torpedo countermeasure systems are similar to the German TAU-
2000 and the Italian C303/310 torpedo countermeasure systems (Jane's Undenvater 
Waifare Systems, pp. 169-171). The four jammers are shot in pairs, with one jammer on 
each side of the submarine, and with an interval of 14 seconds between the two pairs. 
They are self-propelled with a short range. At a relative course 30 degrees off the 
submarine's course to each side, they swim 40 meters out to a position where they stop 
and become stationary while emitting the acoustic noise. The four jammers then form a 
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cluster of noise around the submarine in the crucial first 25 - 30 seconds (Figure 1), so 




Figure 1: Example of how jammers are deployed around the submarine's track. 
The torpedo might then make contact with the decoy. The decoy is also self-
propelled with a speed of 17 kt and a range of 10000 meters. It responds to the sonar 
transmissions from the torpedo and returns a signal that is meant to sound like the echo 
from a submarine. The decoy is ordered on a course perpendicular to the bearing of the 
torpedo. While the decoy attracts the torpedo towards itself, the submarine runs at 
maximum speed in the opposite direction. The submarine attempts to keep the existing 
cluster of noisemakers, still stationed in its deployed position, between itself, and the 
decoy and torpedo. 
4. The Geometry of the Scenario 
Each scenario's geometry depends on the relative bearing of the torpedo to the 
submarine. More specifically, the bearing is established at the time the submarine detects 
torpedo. At that moment, the submarine must react quickly to the incoming threat, and 
conducts necessary counteractions as soon as possible. Based on the bearing to the 
torpedo, the submarine calculates the firing course of its decoy and its own evasive 
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maneuver. In general there are four different situations, one for each of the quadrants 
around the submarine from which the torpedo can come. For each of these situations the 
submarine reacts differently as to which way it turns and where it sends its decoy. 
By using the decoy, the submarine tries to keep the torpedo as far away from itself 
as possible. That is achieved by sending the decoy on to a course perpendicular to the 
bearing of the torpedo, and then turning the submarine towards a course reciprocal to the 
decoy's course. With respect to bringing the submarine away from its initial position, the 
tum itself does not contribute as much as a linear motion would. For this reason, and also 
because a tum decreases the submarine's acceleration, it is of importance for the 
submarine not to tum more than necessary. In order to never tum more than 90 degrees, 
the decoy is always shot on a course into the two aft quadrants of the submarine. 
In all of the scenarios, the initial velocity of the submarine has been defined with 
a direction of ( -1, 0); the areas initially related to the forward part of the submarine are 
the second and the third quadrants of the circle, respectively related to the starboard and 
port sides of the submarine. Similarly, the areas aft of the submarine are related to the 
first and the fourth quadrants of the circle. The first quadrant is on the starboard side and 
the fourth on the port side. 
a. Incoming Torpedo in Quadrant II 
When the bearing of the torpedo is to the starboard side of the submarine 
from relatively straight ahead to 90 degrees starboard, the decoy is fired into Quadrant I 
on a course perpendicular to the torpedo's bearing. The submarine accelerates and turns 
port to a course in the third quadrant where it might keep the decoy straight aft of itself. 
(ref Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Example of a scenario where the torpedo comes from the 2nd quadrant 
b. Incoming Torpedo in Quadrant III 
The submarine's reaction to an incoming torpedo from the third quadrant 
is similar to its reaction in the second quadrant scenario. In this case the submarine fires 
the decoy into the fourth quadrant, perpendicular to the bearing of the torpedo. The 
submarine evades by accelerating to maximum speed and turns to starboard into the 
second quadrant. (ref Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Example of a scenario where the torpedo comes from the 3'd quadrant 
c. Incoming Torpedo in Quadrant I 
When the bearing at the time of detection from the submarine to the 
torpedo is in the first quadrant, the decoy is again fired into the fourth quadrant, and the 
submarine evades to starboard into the second quadrant. (ref Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Example of a scenario where the torpedo comes from the pt quadrant 
d. Incoming Torpedo in Quadrant IV 
When the bearing at the time of detection from the submarine to the 
torpedo is in the fourth quadrant, the decoy is fired into the first quadrant, and the 
submarine evades to port into the third quadrant. (ref Figure 5). 
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Quadrant II Quadrant I 
Quadrant IV 
Figure 5: Example of a scenario where the torpedo comes from the 4th quadrant 
Ideally, if the submarine's turn-radius is close to zero, the submarine 
should turn to a course that is the torpedo bearing +1- 90 degrees. Since the submarine 
has a relatively large turn radius in this scenario, 120 meters, the submarine would in 
some cases have made a turn that is too large. In the worst cases, when the relative 
bearing to the torpedo is nearly straight-ahead or nearly straight aft, the decoy is shot on a 
course nearly perpendicular to the submarine's course, and the submarine 
correspondingly must make a large turn. Those cases should be seen as the most 
extreme, and the geometry shows that the submarine should not have to turn as much as 
90 degrees in order to keep the decoy and the torpedo straight aft. (ref Figure 6). 
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Torpedo 
Figure 6: The submarine's turn-angle 8 
The geometry also depends on how far from the submarine the torpedo is 
when the submarine's counteractions start. If the torpedo is detected while it is far from 
the submarine, it gives the decoy more time to move away from the submarine before it is 
caught by the torpedo than if the torpedo is detected close to the submarine. In all 
scenarios where the decoy's course is perpendicular to the submarine's initial course, the 
magnitude of the submarine's tum depends on the distance B to the torpedo at the start of 
the torpedo counter actions, the submarine's tum radius r, the torpedo speed v1 and the 
decoy speed vd. The timet is the time when the torpedo recognizes the decoy and starts a 
new search for the submarine again. The timet gives the start position C of the torpedo's 
new search, which is the position the submarine would want to keep straight aft when 
running away. 
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The submarine's tum is therefore a function of the distance C to the 
position where the torpedo starts a new search, and the submarine's tum radius r. 
e =cos -l(_r J 
C+r 
This is the exact magnitude of the tum the submarine should conduct in 
the cases where decoys are launched on courses perpendicular to the courses of the 
submarines, instead of the first calculation which was a 90 degree tum. e is measured 
from the bow of the submarine (-1, 0). A negative valued e describes a starboard tum, 
and a positive valued e describes a port tum. 
For cases where the bearing of the torpedo (~t), which is measured from 
( 1, 0), is not straight ahead or straight aft, the above expression is not valid. If the 
bearing of the torpedo is in Quadrant I or II (0° < ~t ~ 180°) the following approximation 
is used: 
cos-'( c:r) 
e = ((.Br +90)-180)· 9o -
The first part of this expression is the tum the submarine would have done 
if its tum radius had been close to zero. The second part decreases the tum in order to 
incorporate the magnitude of the tum radius. 
If the bearing of the torpedo is in Quadrant III or IV (180° < ~t ~ 360°) the 
following approximation is used instead: 
cos-'( c:r) 
e = ((.Br -90)-180)· - -
90 
Since the submarine's initial direction is defined to be ( -1 ,0), its initial 
course is also 180 degrees. The above approximations simplify the calculations of the 
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magnitude and direction of the tum for all the scenarios, and do not introduce significant 
errors for the MOE estimated. 
This chapter has described the scenario and the systems. The next chapter 
presents modeling of the systems for the simulation. 
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III. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
This chapter describes the analytic model integrating each of the weapon systems 
and the interaction among the weapons systems. The model is created to most closely 
approximate the systems and their behavior as described in Chapter II. This chapter 
discusses assumptions and approximations of the model. The next chapter discusses the 
implementation of the model and presents the computer model, a discrete-event 
simulation. 
A. THE TORPEDO MODEL 
The torpedo. is modeled with two modes, search mode and attack mode, supported 
by four major features. The first of these features is the search pattern, which is used 
when the torpedo lacks contacts to lock onto and attack. The second feature is the target 
selection logic. The third is the attacking run, and the last is the classification of a non-
target, such as a decoy. 
1. The Search Pattern 
The torpedo is dropped from chosen positions within its sonar range of 1500 
meters of the submarine. To orient the torpedo, its initial direction is headed towards the 
initial position of the submarine. 
When the torpedo is dropped, it immediately begins to search. The search pattern 
continues when the torpedo loses the contacts it made or when it correctly classifies the 
decoy it has chased and begins to locate its real target, the submarine. Since the 
torpedo's sonar is limited to a sector of 45 degrees to each side of the centerline of the 
torpedo, the search is conducted by circling. The sonar covers the area within a radius of 
the sonar range plus the torpedo's turn radius rr. To approximate the torpedo's circling 
search, the model uses a hexagon (ref Figure 7). As shown below, this assumption does 
not introduce significant errors for the MOE estimated. 
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Figure 7: The hexagon path of the torpedo search pattern. 
The model rotates the torpedo through the six vertices of the hexagon. The 
hexagon path approximates the circular path fairly accurately~ an adjustment makes the 
simulated torpedo take the same lap time as it would have in a perfect circle. This is 
achieved by letting each leg 1 in the hexagon be a bit longer than the original r1• 
1t 1 = -r, = 1.047r, 
3 
Using the hexagon as an approximation for the circular sweep causes the torpedo 
to move slightly outside the original circle at each of the vertices. Note, however, that 
the torpedo moves mostly inside the circle at each leg. The missing part of the radius is 
r.,,, +-"~} = 0.093r, 
When the search is initiated, the torpedo makes a 30-degree (81) turn to port onto 
the first leg l of the hexagon. The next turn (82), and all the subsequent turns in the 
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search will be 60-degree turns to port. Until the torpedo makes acoustic contact with a 
target, it continues this search pattern. 
The area covered by the torpedo sensor conducting the hexagonal search (Ah) 
relative to the area covered by a perfect circle search (As), depends on the range of the 
sensor perpendicular to the torpedo's centerline (Rp) and of the radius of the circle r1• The 
relationship between these two areas is expressed by the equation: 
7( 7( 2 
Ah = 2J3rt +RP 3rt +J3Rp 
As 
If the radius rr equals 50 meters and the perpendicular range (Rp) of the sonar is 
close to zero, the value of this relationship is approximately 0.91. In this case the 
hexagonal search model covers a search area about 9% smaller than a circle search would 
cover. 
With an increasing sensor range, the relationship quickly increases to a value 
greater than one. For a realistic range of approximately 1000 meters to each side of the 
torpedo (Rp), the value of this relationship is about 1.09. The maximum sonar range used 
in this model is 1500 meters, which for a+/- 45-degree sonar sector has a side range of Rp 
= 1500-h/2. In this case, the relationship between Ah and As is 1.091. This means that 
the area covered by the hexagonal search model, with sensor coverage, is at most 9.1% 
larger than the sensor coverage for a search conducted in a perfect circle. This hexagonal 
approximation to the search is regarded as a sufficient model for the torpedo's search 
pattern. 
2. The Target Selection Logic 
The torpedo's sonar is implemented in the model by a constant-rate sensor. A 
constant rate sensor has two parameters; the maximum range and the detection rate. 
When a target enters the sensor's range the time to detection is exponentially distributed 
with a mean value of the inverse of the sensor's detection rate. If the target leaves the 
sensor's range before the detection time, the detection is cancelled. Note that in reality, a 
l 
torpedo has a sensor-sector of +1- 45 degrees from the centerline of the torpedo, and 
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should not make contact with targets outside its sensor-sector. Below it is explained how 
this sector is implemented. 
In the model, the torpedo detects sonar emissions and stores detected contacts in a 
detection list that the torpedo brain "logic" evaluates. Possible contacts can be 
submarines, decoys, or one of the jammers. Jammers are not considered targets; at each 
sonar "ping," contacts classified as jammers are copied into a "jammer list," and all other 
contacts are copied to a possible target list. 
Contacts may be eliminated from the target list in two situations. First, the 
bearing of each of the contacts on the target list is checked to see if they are within the 
sector of the torpedo's sensor. Targets not within the torpedo's sector are removed from 
the target list. 
The positions of possible targets are then compared with the positions of each of 
the jammers from the jammer list. These noisemakers are modeled as an ideal form for 
jammers. The jammers are assumed to be 100% efficient, and a target located behind the 
circle formed by the jammer and its jamming radius will not be detected. Targets located 
behind the circle of the jammer and its radius are removed from the target list. 
When a target is removed from the target list it continues to exist on the contact 
list, and is available for evaluation at the next simulated sonar emission. The torpedo and 
the contacts will then have moved relative to each other, and a contact that had been 
removed from the target list is again a potential target. 
Once the target list is accepted, the torpedo begins its attack on a target. If only 
one contact remains on the target list, the torpedo's choice is simple - the torpedo begins 
attacking the target. If there are two contacts on the target list, a submarine and a decoy, 
the torpedo automatically chooses the decoy. This assumption reflects how a decoy is 
meant to work tactically. This is also an ideal way of implementing the target echo 
strength (TES) for the decoy and the submarine, which are modeled as high and low, 
respectively. Thus, the model assumes that if the torpedo initially begins to chase the 
submarine but receives target criteria to misidentify the decoy at a later sonar emission, it 
switches focus to the decoy and chases it instead. This allows the decoy to stop the 
torpedo's attack on the submarine, giving the submarine a chance to evade. 
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3. The Chase 
When the torpedo begins chasing its target, the path of the torpedo is updated 
after each sonar emission. Each sonar ping provides the torpedo with the distance and the 
bearing to the target, so that the torpedo can guide itself step by step towards the target. 
The torpedo does not take the shortest route to intercept the target, but instead follows a 
curved line, with a slope increasing towards the point of interception. This path might be 
called a "dog-curve," because it resembles the path a dog follows during a chase. (Dogs 
are obviously not good at calculating the point of interception!) 
4. The Classification of a Target or a Non-Target 
When the torpedo has caught the decoy it quickly reclassifies it correctly, and 
begins a new search for the submarine. The model prohibits the torpedo from making 
contact with the decoy again, because that scenario shifts focus away from the objective 
of the thesis. (The model might measure the effectiveness of the torpedo countermeasure 
system instead of the submarine's maximum speed's impact on the survivability of the 
submarine.) 
To be able to simulate the model, additional assumptions about detection of 
contacts are made. The first is that the model allows the torpedo to reclassify the decoy 
when the two are close enough together to provide the torpedo with indications that its 
ignition mechanism should have ignited. Ignition occurs when the torpedo receives the 
correct magnetic signature from the target or, when the target is a submarine, the torpedo 
receives the correct force from the impact. Since the decoy gives neither, the torpedo is 
able to reclassify the decoy as a non-submarine. 
In the model the torpedo kills a target at the time the sensor gives the information 
that the distance to the target is closer than one meter. When the torpedo kills the target, 
. its state becomes undetectable. This ensures that the torpedo does not make contact with 
the same target again, no matter whether the target was a decoy or a submarine. If the 
killed target was a decoy (which is now undetectable), the torpedo attacks the next target 
on its contact list; if it has a contact, it should be the submarine. If it does not have any 
contact on the contact list or if the listed contacts are either outside its sensor-sector or 
shielded by one of the jammers, the torpedo again starts on its search pattern. 
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B. THE SUBMARINE MODEL 
To model the submarine, assumptions must be made about velocity, speed, turns, 
and factors affecting its movement. On each simulation run, the submarine moves in a 
initial direction defined to be (-1, 0). The initial speed is a variable that can be changed 
in the program, but is in this thesis kept at the same value for all the experimental runs. 
The initial speed is set at 5 kt. The maximum speed to which the submarine can 
accelerate is the independent variable in the model, and varies from 12 and 25 knots for 
each set of simulations. 
The two main features of the submarine model are both related to its evasive 
actions. The first is the initialization of the torpedo countermeasures, and the second is 
the evasion by the submarine itself. Both of these evasive actions are executed at a 
randomly chosen delayed time, after the submarine has detected the torpedo. The delay 
time is chosen to simulate a reaction time from the submarine's Commanding Officer or 
the Officer on Watch. As with the torpedo, a constant-rate sensor implements the 
submarine's sensors. The submarine's sonar is passive and therefore detects the torpedo's 
active sonar emission. The model assumes the detection range of the submarine's sensor 
is twice the range of the torpedo's sensor range. 
The model initializes the submarine's evasive actions after it has calculated in 
which of the quadrants the torpedo is located (ref Section ll.B.4). The submarine then 
chooses to send the decoy to either Quadrant I or IV, and turns the submarine into 
Quadrant ill or II, respectively. 
1. The Execution of the Torpedo Countermeasures 
When the evasive actions are executed, the decoy and the first pair of jammers are 
the first elements of the torpedo countermeasure system to be launched from the 
submarine. The submarine calculates the course of the decoy on the basis of the bearing 
of the torpedo before launching the decoy. Fourteen seconds later the next pair of 
jammers is launched. Each pair of jammers launched consists of one jammer on each 
side of the submarine. 
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2. The Evasion by the Submarine 
The submarine is modeled so that it can accelerate and tum at the same time. 
The acceleration is designed with a constant magnitude, which is executed as an on-or-off 
basis in the model. The tum function in the model is based on a fixed-tum radius. 
When the evasive action is executed, the submarine begins to accelerate and tum 
immediately. In reality, a tum causes an extra drag on the submarine; thus the model 
slows the acceleration by decreasing it by a constant factor of 0.9 throughout the tum. If 
the submarine reaches maximum speed during the tum, it finishes the tum with constant 
(maximum) speed. In most cases though, the tum is finished before the submarine has 
reached maximum speed; when the tum is complete, the submarine continues to 
accelerate with maximum acceleration until maximum speed is reached. After both the 
tum and the acceleration have been completed, the submarine continues straight ahead on 
one course at maximum speed. It continues until the torpedo kills it or the torpedo 
reaches the end of its endurance. At this point the simulation ends. 
C. THE TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURE MODEL 
The two basic elements of the torpedo countermeasure system, the decoy and the 
jammers, are modeled so that the submarine executes each one at the appropriate time. 
The behavior and the properties of the jammers and the decoy are modeled in a manner 
that is as realistic as possible. 
1. TheDecoy 
The decoy is modeled so that it is launched on a course perpendicular to the 
bearing to the incoming torpedo (ref Chapter II). The model allows the decoy to move 
with a constant velocity of 17 knots to a position 10,000 meters from the submarine. The 
distance of 10,000 meters is chosen to ensure that the decoy does not stop before the 
torpedo has had enough time to investigate it. The decoy is undetectable as long as it has 
the same position as the submarine, but the moment it leaves its platform it becomes 
detectable. When the torpedo has caught and killed the decoy, the decoy continues to 
exist in the model, but is no longer detectable. It does not interfere with the torpedo's 
next task of detecting and attacking the submarine. 
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2. The Jammers 
Depending on the position of the jammer, starboard or port side of the submarine, 
the submarine orders the jammer to move to a position 40 meters away from the firing 
position, 30 degrees off the submarine's course to its chosen side. Each jammer is 
modeled with a speed of 8 knots, fast enough to get it in front of the submarine. Each of 
the jammers is equipped with a jamming radius set to 20 meters. The jamming radius is 
copied and used by the torpedo when it checks to see if the jammer shields the target. 
The jammers are modeled to take position in front of and on each side of the submarine, 
creating a protective screen around the submarine. 
This chapter described how the scenario and the weapon systems are modeled. 
The next chapter discusses the implementation of the model as a simulation. 
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION PROGRAM 
This chapter describes how the models of the weapon systems and their behavior 
described in the previous chapter are implemented in Java programming code. It presents 
the main subroutine called a "class" in Java, and the most important classes that form the 
simulation model. Main class instantiates ("calls into being" and assigns initial 
parameter values to) all systems and executes the simulation model. Other classes 
incorporate the features of each of the systems and provide the structure to model the 
interaction between the systems. To implement the simulation model, the Sirnkit 
simulation package created by Professor Arnold Buss at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) and Kirk Stork, a graduate of NPS, has been used (ref Stork, 1996). 
A. THE MAIN CLASS 
To execute the discrete event simulation model, the main class called 
Sub Experiment is used. All variables for each system are inputs to the class 
SubExperiment. This class instantiates the main objects (the submarine, torpedoes, 
decoys and jammers), and connects them to each other by the SimEventListener function, 
and the MediatorFactory and Referee classes in Sirnkit. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TORPEDO MODEL 
The class BasicMover implements the interface Mover to model the torpedo's 
motion. A BasicMover models uniform linear motion from point A to point B. 
The torpedo's actions are governed by two classes. One class, called the 
TorpedoManager, directs the initial start and search motions of the torpedo. The second 
class, called the TorpedoBrain, interprets the torpedo's tactical picture of the contacts 
around the torpedo at each sonar emission. The TorpedoBrain decides if the torpedo 
attacks or searches. It then directs the TorpedoManager to execute either the search or 
the next leg of the torpedo's maneuvers if it is attacking (ref Chapter ill). 
The torpedo's sensor is implemented in a class called TorpedoSensor, which 
models a constant rate sensor. As described in Chapter III, the model is that of a "cookie-
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cutter" sensor, but with an exponentially distributed random delay of detection after an 
object enters the sensor's range. 
The TorpedoSensor schedules each of the sonar emissions (the "sonar pings") 
which the TorpedoBrain "hears." The TorpedoBrain registers each sonar ping as it 
occurs; it then requests other information needed to evaluate its contacts. The class 
TorpedoSonarRoom creates and keeps a Hashtable list of the detected contacts. All 
objects in the scenario are initially detectable and are treated as contacts by the 
TorpedoSensor. The TorpedoSonarRoom assigns different values to each of the contacts, 
depending on whether the contact is a submarine, a decoy, or a jammer. 
The TorpedoBrain copies the TorpedoSonarRoom's list of contacts at each sonar 
ping, and begins iterating through the list. The TorpedoBrain first sorts the contacts into 
two lists: potential targets (decoy and submarine) go into a target list, and jammers into a 
jammer list. The two lists are then further refined to exclude invalid contacts. 
One type of contact excluded is an object located outside the torpedo's sensor 
sector or range. The constant rate sensor used by TorpedoSensor detects all objects 
within its range. The TorpedoBrain evaluates whether a potential target is located within 
the sector of the torpedo's sensor (a symmetric area around the torpedo's heading), and 
removes contacts outside this area from the target list. 
The TorpedoBrain also evaluates whether a jammer shields a potential target from 
the torpedo, and removes shielded targets from the target list. The TorpedoBrain 
previously received information on contacts including the jamming-radius for all 
jammers (instantiated from the main class). The TorpedoBrain then calculates whether 
the target is shielded by one of the jammers using the jamming-radius and the updated 
positions of the target and the jammers at the time of the sonar ping. The Torpedo Brain 
relates this information to the torpedo's position, which calculates the "shadow" created 
by the jammer. If a jammer (and its "shadow") shields a potential target from the 
torpedo, the contact is removed from the target list. 
After excluding shielded or out-of-range contacts, the TorpedoBrain iterates 
through the target list to decide which target to attack. If the target list contains two 
contacts, the decoy (which has the largest target echo strength value designated by the 
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TorpedoSonarRoom), is attacked. If only one contact remains on the list, that target is 
attacked. 
Finally, if the target list is empty the TorpedoBrain orders the torpedo to begin a 
new search pattern. 
1. The Search Pattern 
The torpedo's search pattern is implemented in the TorpedoManager. As 
discussed in Chapter ill, each point in the search pattern (each of the vertices in the 
hexagon) is calculated on the basis of the previous direction. 
2. The Chase 
When the torpedo starts its chase after a target, the path of the torpedo is updated 
based on each sonar emission. At the time of each sonar ping, the TorpedoBrain class 
requests information about each target and directs the torpedo step by step to the target by 
the order moveTo(target's position). The time interval between each of the sonar pings is 
set to one second. 
3. The Classification of a Decoy 
To remove the decoy from the simulation once it is detected and killed, the decoy 
is a subclass of the class MortalMover. This class allows the torpedo to "kill" the decoy 
when the distance between them has reached a preset minimum (20 meters). When 
killed, the state of the target becomes undetectable. 
C. THE SUBMARINE MODEL 
Two classes, SubmarineManager and SubmarineBrain govern the submarine. For 
each run the submarine will be started with an initial velocity which direction is defined 
by the main class to be (-1, 0). The main class positions the submarine in its initial 
position (0, 0), and orders it to move to the position ( -2000, 0) by the order move To in the 
class SubmarineManager. 
All of the later actions executed by the submarine are implemented by the class 
SubmarineR rain in the model. SubmarineR rain calculates in which of the quadrants 
around the submarine (ref Section II.B.4) the torpedo is located. It then decides to send 
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the decoy to Quadrant I or IV and to tum the submarine into Quadrant ITI or II, 
respectively. 
1. The Execution of the Torpedo Countermeasures 
The SubmarineBrain calculates the course of the decoy on the basis of the bearing 
of the torpedo. It calculates the end position of the decoy, and schedules the time to 
launch the decoy. The SubmarineBrain also calculates the course and end position of 
each ofthe jammers on the basis of the submarine's course and launch position. Both the 
decoy and the jammers, which are of the class Target, are sequentially instantiated by the 
SubmarineBrain before it launches them. 
2. The Evasion by the Submarine 
The submarine's evasive maneuvers, turning away from its decoy and 
accelerating, are both implemented in the class SubmarineManager. The class 
BasicMover, which models linear motion, positions the submarine. SubmarineManager 
subdivides the submarine's tum into linear segments by small instant shifts of direction. 
Each tum begins with a 7.5-degree change in direction (81 in Figure 8), maintains 15-
degree shifts, and continues turning until the last shift of 15 or fewer degrees. Each of 
these tum segments follows a circular path so that the submarine maintains its preset tum 
radius. At each shift of direction the SubmarineManager calculates the coordinates of the 
next vertex of the path on the basis of the previous leg's direction and by a shift of basis 
into the standard coordinate system of the model. The order moveTo(next position) 
directs the submarine into its new position. 
The submarine's acceleration during the tum is implement in the model by the 
SubmarineManager. SubmarineManager calculates the time the submarine uses to get to 
the next vertex of the path at constant acceleration. On that basis it calculates and orders 
an average speed for the next leg. 
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Figure 8: The tum segments of the submarine. 
The SubmarineManager also calculates the submarine's acceleration during the 
submarine's linear motion. In these cases SubmarineManager divides the submarine's 
path in segments of 10 seconds time intervals, and calculates and orders an average speed 
for each segment. 
D. THE TORPEDO COUNTERMEASURE MODEL 
The two basic elements of the submarine's torpedo countermeasure system, the 
decoy and the jammers, are implemented in the class Target, an extension of 
MortalMover. SubmarineBrain models the behavior of the decoy and jammers, and 
executes them. TorpedoBrain models the way the torpedo evaluates its targets. 
1. TheDecoy 
The SubmarineBrain fires the decoy by instantiating it (naming it "Decoy,") in 
the Target class, and starting it on its course calculated by the SubmarineBrain. 
SubmarineBrain orders the decoy using the moveTo command to a position 10,000 
meters from the submarine. The motion of the decoy is then modeled as a BasicMover. 
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2. The Jammers 
The four jammers, or noisemakers, are also of the class Target and are 
instantiated sequentially by the SubmarineBrain. As with the decoy, BasicMover models 
the motion of the jammers. As described above, TorpedoBrain uses the jamming radius 
to determine if the jammer shields the target from the torpedo in its current position. 
This chapter described how the simulation program models each of the elements 
and their interaction. The next chapter describes the design of the experiment and 
presents the analysis of the results. 
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V. THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
RESULTS 
This chapter describes the design of the simulation experiment, presents ouiput 
data, and analyzes the results. Outcomes are based on the measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) defined in Chapter II. This MOE is the probability that the incoming torpedo 
does not catch the submarine, based on the maximum speed of the submarine (ref 
Chapter II, p 7). The design of the experiment is based on this MOE. 
A. THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The design of the experiment provides results on the ability of the submarine to 
evade torpedoes at varying speeds. The parameters expected to influence the outcome of 
each run (i.e., does the torpedo catch the submarine or not) are the initial speed of the 
submarine, the maximum speed of the submarine, and the start position of the torpedo. 
The experiment chosen is of robust design, where the start position of the torpedo 
is fixed at given positions. In reality, the drop position of the torpedo relative to the 
submarine is an uncontrollable factor for the submarine. The experiment treats 
uncontrollable factors as sources of noise (ref Sanchez et al. 1998). The design point 
provides an estimate of mean performance and of the uncontrolled variability. 
The experiments cover all four quadrants and both sides of the submarine, but are 
not symmetric on each side of the submarine. The torpedo conducts its search pattern by 
circling counter-clockwise, thus the torpedo always turns left when it begins its search. 
The experimental drop positions of the torpedo are divided into four bearings, one in each 
quadrant, and two distances, one close and one further out (ref Figure 9). The close drop 
positions are approximately 500 meters and the longer distance drop positions 
approximately 1400 meters from the submarine. The experiment is thus based on these 








• Quadrant IV 
Torpedo Start Position: • I 
Figure 9: The eight start positions of the torpedo. 
The initial speed of the submarine does not vary throughout the experiment, while 
the maximum speed of the submarine varies. A conventional submarine normally cruises 
at speeds between two knots and six knots and in most cases maintains a speed between 
three and ten when it is attacking. The initial speed of the submarine is five knots during 
the experiment, since that speed is regarded as a likely average speed. 
Three maximum speeds, one low, one medium, and one high are used in the 
initial part of the experiment. They have been chosen to establish whether the 
relationship between the probability of survival and the maximum speed of the submarine 
is linear, and to identify a range of speeds to be investigated further. The three maximum 
speeds tested in the initial part of the experiment are 12 knots, 18 knots and 25 knots. A 
maximum speed of 12 knots is an extremely low maximum speed for a submarine, 25 
knots is a very high speed for a conventional submarine, and 18 knots is a common 
maximum speed in today's submarine designs (ref Chapter II). 
The eight start positions of the torpedo and three maximum speeds of the 
submanne give a total of 24 configurations or design points. Each of these design points 
can be run for a specific number of iterations. The variability of each iteration within 
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each configuration is provided by the random time delays of the constant rate sensors of 
both the torpedo and the submarine, and by the random time delay of the firing of each 
countermeasure element. Fifty iterations are run for each design point using common 
random numbers (ref Law and Kelton, 1991) for the sensor detection times and the 
launch times of the countermeasure system. Based on the runs from the first 24 design 
points, new design points are identified for the next set of simulations. The outcome of 
the experiments is the probability of survival of the submarine based on the number of 
times the submarine was caught by the torpedo for each design point and maximum speed 
parameter. 
The next section presents the results from the initial experiment and analyzes 
these results. 
B. THE OUTCOME OF THE SIMULATION OF THE FIRST SET OF 
DESIGN POINTS 
As described in the previous section, the first set of simulation experiments 
consists of 24 design points (eight torpedo drop positions times three maximum speeds) 
with 50 replications at each design point. The results show that the submarine is killed in 
every one of the runs where the torpedo starts at the closest range (ref Table 1) regardless 
of the maximum speed of the submarine. These results also show that the probability of 
survival (P5) for a submarine with maximum speed 12 is zero. 
Torpedo Start Position 
Short dist, Quadrant 1 
Short dist, Quadrant 2 
Short dist, Quadrant 3 
Short dist, Quadrant 4 
Long dist, Quadrant 1 
Long dist, Quadrant 2 
Long dist, Quadrant 3 





























Table 1: Probability of survival of the submarine at varying maximum speeds 
and drop positions of the torpedo. 
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Because the probability of survival is zero for all the runs in which the torpedo is 
dropped at a close distance, the data based on design points using close distances are not 
analyzed further, nor are such design point investigated in additional simulation runs. 
The asymmetry between the results from Quadrant I and IT versus Quadrant III 
and IV is surprising, but might be explained by the search pattern of the torpedo which 
always turns counter-clockwise. Although it is not the focus of this thesis to analyze the 
survivability of the submarine as a function of the direction from which an attack comes 
(other than the design points previously mentioned), a caution about the interpretation of 
results must be stated. The initial experiments and probabilities for survival generated 
show different results among the quadrants. As noted above, no symmetry among runs 
from different quadrants is expected due to the counter clockwise search pattern of the 
torpedo. It is difficult to explain, however, why the difference between Quadrants I and 
IT, and Quadrants ill and IV, are so large. Perhaps the answer lies in the search pattern of 
the torpedo. When the torpedo starts in either the first or second quadrant, it by default 
turns left towards the decoy. The opposite situation occurs in the third and fourth 
quadrants where the torpedo turns away from the decoy during its first left turn. The 
torpedo's behavior is the only source of asymmetry in these scenarios, so it is logical that 
this is the cause of the asymmetry in the results. 
When investigating design points representing the long distance torpedo drop 
positions (1400 meters), two results are of interest. Firstly, the probability of survival is 
always zero for the slow (12 knot) submarine. Secondly, the probabilities of survival for 
the 18-knot and 25-knot submarines in each of the quadrants are equal. (ref Table 2). 
In order to find the relationship between maximum speed and the probability of 
survival, the results from each of the quadrants are pooled into one probability measure 
for each maximum speed. These pooled results with a 95% confidence interval, are 
shown in Figure 10. 
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Quadrant Position Sub Speed P(survival) P(kill) #of kills 
1 (1 000.00, 1 000.00) 12 0 1 50 
1 (1 000.00, 1 000.00) 18 0.6 0.4 20 
1 (1 000.00, 1 000.00) 25 0.6 0.4 20 
2 ( -1 000.00, 1 000.00) 12 0 1 50 
2 (-1 000.00, 1 000.00) 18 0.58 0.42 21 
'2 (-1000.00, 1000.00) 25 0.58 0.42 21 
3 (-1000.00, -1000.00) 12 0 1 50 
3 (-1000.00, -1000.00) 18 0.24 0.76 38 
3 (-1000.00, -1000.00) 25 0.24 0.76 38 
4 (1 000.00, -1 000.00) 12 0 1 50 
4 (1 000.00, -1 000.00) 18 0.32 0.68 34 
4 (1 000.00, -1 000.00) 25 0.32 0.68 34 
Table 2: Results from the simulations where the torpedo started at the long 
distance. 
The result from the 12-knot submarine is obviously the worst of these results; the 
probability of being killed is certain with zero variance. At this stage it can be concluded 
that a submarine designed with a maximum speed of 18 knots has a higher probability of 
survival than one with 12 knots. 
Mean Prob. of Survival with 95% Cl 
tV 0.6 
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Figure 10: Results from the simulations where the torpedo started at the long 
distance. 
The relationship between speed and the probability of survival for submarine's 
with 18 and 25 knot maximum speeds is identical. Although maximum speeds above 25 
knots are nearly impossible for conventional submarines, it is still of interest to see how 
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this model functions for higher maximum speeds. Specifically, will survivability remain 
constant or rise with greater maximum speed? 
Also, the initial experiment does not show how the probability of survival 
increases between 12 and 18 knots. Further simulation runs therefore investigate 
maximum speeds between 12 and 18 knots and test how the model performs for 
maximum speeds above 25 knots. 
C. THE OUTCOME OF THE SIMULATION WITH ADDITIONAL SETS OF 
DESIGN POINTS 
This experiment investigates design points using speeds of 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 
knots at each of the four long drop positions. A maximum speed of 30 knots is also 
simulated at four drop positions. The analysis of these additional data and elements of 
the data from the previous section follow. 
1. Analysis of the Extended Experiment 
The results from the extended experiment show the relationship between the 
probability of survival and maximum speed with respect to each of the quadrants the 
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Figure 11: Probability of survival versus speed for each of the quadrants. 
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The graph shows that if the torpedo is dropped in Quadrant I or II, the probability 
of survival is much greater than if dropped in the two other quadrants. This fact was also 
shown in the initial experiment. Secondly, the graph shows that for Quadrants I and II the 
best probability is met at a lower maximum speed than for Quadrants ill and IV. In the 
13 to 18 knots range the slope is higher for Quadrants I and II than for Quadrants ill and 
IV. However at maximum speed of 18 knots or greater the maximum probability of 
survival is achieved in all quadrants. Furthermore the probability of survival stays 
constant for all the quadrants for maximum speeds above 18 knots. 
While the differences in the survival probabilities among the four quadrants are 
interesting from a tactical point of view, they are not the main focus of this thesis. The 
designed maximum speed of the submarine should result in good surviving probabilities 
regardless of the torpedo's bearing. Therefore the data are pooled into one set of data for 
each maximum speed in order to analyze survival probabilities across all quadrants. 
The pooled data set for each incremental maximum speed from 12 to 30 knots are 
shown in Figure 12. The graph shows that the confidence interval of the probability of 
survival increases as the maximum speed increases from 12 to 18 knots. At 12 knots the 
probability of survival is zero without any variability at all. When the maximum speed 
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Figure 12: Mean survival probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. 
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In order to understand the relationship between survival probability and speed 
better the data curve was fit to a three parameter logistic regression model. This model 
hypothesizes an equation of the form 
Ps = /31 
1 + exp(- /32 (MaxSpeed- /33 )) 
where Psis the mean probability of survival. Using the data set resulting from the 
simulation, theWs are estimated as: 13I = 0.43, f32 = 1.90, and l33 = 14.14. This estimation 
was performed by the statistical package S-Plus. The curve that best approximates the 
data under this model can therefore be expressed as follows: 
Ps= 0.43 
1 + exp(-1.90(MaxSpeed -14.14)) · 
Figure 13 shows how the equation approximates the data points from the simulation. 
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Figure 13: The curve of the three parameter logistic equation and the scatter plot 
of the probability of survival data versus maximum speed. 
The parameter 13 1 represents the asymptotic upper limit of the curve, while l33 
represents the turning point. The parameter f3z together with f31 and f33 describes the slope 
of the curve as follows: 
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dy _ {Jtf32 (exp(- /32 (x- /33 ))) 
dx - (1 + exp(- /32 (x- PJ)Y . 
For example at a speed that gives the maximum slope at the turning point ~3 the 




For these values the equation gives a slope of 0.203 when the maximum speed is 14.14 
knots. 
This estimation provided an equation describing the relationship between the 
probability of survival of the submarine and its maximum speed. The following section 
describes how the results from the simulation and the survivability curve are interpreted. 
2. Interpretation of the Results 
The conventional view from WWI and WWII that more speed is better has been 
confirmed in the speed range from 12 to 18 knots. This is clearly shown with the use of 
the type of countermeasures used in this model. Without more effective countermeasures 
maximum speeds below 18 knots should not be considered. 
The fact that the probability of survival does not increase for maximum speeds 
above 18 knots is quite surprising however. One would have thought that the probability 
of survival would increase as the maximum speed increases. One possible explanation of 
the results for maximum speeds above 18 knots is as follows. The faster speeds are not 
sufficient to carry the submarine out of the torpedo's range for those scenarios in which 
the torpedo acquires the submarine. At that point it becomes a race that the torpedo 
always wins. Therefore faster speeds do not help the submarine in those scenarios. 
The time at which the torpedo gains contact with the submarine after the 
investigation of the decoy is done depends on the relative position of the jammers, the 
submarine, and the torpedo. If the submarine emerges into the line of sight of the 
torpedo, it will have to be within the torpedo's sensor range for the torpedo to acquire. 
Since the initial geometry in each run is identical for each maximum speed in the 
expenment, the distance between the torpedo and the submarine when detection takes 
place is a function of the submarine's maximum speed. However the increased distances 
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are not sufficient for the submarine to escape in those cases. The randomness build into 
the model will allow a certain proportion of the submarines to enter the torpedo's sensor 
range at a time when the torpedo is not directing its sensor towards the submarine. If the 
submarine has sufficient speed it will manage to get outside the torpedo's sensor range by 
the time the torpedo has done one turn of its search and is directing the sensor towards 
the submarine. A slow submarine will not manage that. A certain proportion of the 
submarines will not manage to get out of the torpedo's sensor range however high its 
maximum speed is. 
In light of the relationship between the probability of survival of the submarine 
and its maximum speed, it is of importance to revisit the assumptions of the model and 
the design of the experiment. Although all factors were described in earlier chapters, two 
of the most important ones are highlighted here. 
The initial speed of the submarine was five knots for all the experimental runs. 
That parameter may vary widely in real situations. It is not, for example, the worst case 
imaginable, where the submarine is dead-in-water. In such a case, the submarine must 
accelerate for a longer time before it reaches its maximum speed, giving the torpedo 
much more time to catch it. 
The jammers are modeled in this thesis as "cookie-cutter" noisemakers, which are 
100% efficient within a specific radius. A real jammer could possibly be 100% efficient 
against a torpedo sonar within a jamming radius, but could also have a reduced effect 
outside that radius. Two or more jammers might overlap so that the combined area forms 
a unified 100% efficient wall of sound against the torpedo sonar. The radius of each of 
the jammers might also in reality have a different radius than what is modeled here. The 
radius could possibly change from location to location or from day to day, depending on 
the oceanographic conditions and the acoustic conditions of the surrounding water. 
How would changes to the assumptions of initial speed and jammer efficiency 
influence the probability of survival curve? Perhaps the upper asymptotic limit of the 
curve might be lowered, so that the probability of survival decreases for the high 
maximum speed range. Additionally, the entire curve might be shifted to the right, 
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suggesting that the highest probability of survival occurs at maximum speeds greater than 
18 knots. 
The probability of survival curve generated has two distinct segments. Between 
12 and 18 knots, survivability varies widely as a function of maximum speed. A small 
change in maximum speed within this range leads to a large change in the survivability of 
the submarine. In the second segment (between 18 and 30 knots), the curve flattens out. 
Increasing maximum speed does not improve the submarine's probability of survival. 
To design a submarine with a high probability of surviving torpedo attacks, this 
study suggests that the submarine should be capable of reaching maximum speeds equal 
to those in the upper (flat) segment of the curve. This study does not suggest what the 
actual maximum speeds should be because the curve generated depends on the specific 
assumptions described in previous chapters. For a real system not restricted by the 
assumptions made here, the curve might have a different shape, or it may have similar 
shape but be shifted in one direction. Figure 14 shows an example of the latter situation, 
where the curve is shifted two knots to the right. In this example, a 20 knot maximum 
speed (rather than 18) provides the highest probability of survival, and the probability of 
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Figure 14: A shift of the curve of two knots to the right. 
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This example emphasizes how important it is to design a submarine with 
maximum speeds well into the upper flat area of the curve. As this example shows, 
incremental changes in maximum speed until the point where the curve flattens may 
result in large increases in survival probability. 
The final chapter concludes these thoughts and makes recommendations based on 
these findings. 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis has examined the threat to a conventional submarine from a modem 
light torpedo dropped from a ship's helicopters or from maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). 
It simulates the interaction between the submarine, the torpedo, and countermeasure 
systems to determine the effect of speed on the submarine's evasive performance. 
Results of the simulation provide information to the submarine community on the 
probability of submarine survival for a range of maximum speeds. This chapter 
summarizes the major findings and conclusions of the study, and makes 
recommendations for submarine maximum speed. The final section makes suggestions 
for further research. 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The intent of this thesis was to find the relationship between maximum speed of a 
conventional coastal submarine and the evasive capability of the submarine. In the first 
chapter the problem is stated in two questions: 
• What is the effect of a conventional submarine's maximum speed on its 
evasive performance when attacked by a modem light ASW torpedo? 
• What should be the maximum speed of a conventional coastal submarine 
equipped with a torpedo countermeasure system be to ensure a specified 
probability of survival while evading a light ASW torpedo? 
The simulation and analysis of the results show that a relationship exists between 
an evasive performance of a submarine and its maximum speed. Under the assumptions 
of this study, a submarine with maximum speed below 12 knots cannot evade a torpedo. 
The probability of survival for the submarine improves with each incremental increase in 
maximum speed 12 to 18 knots. According to this analysis, speeds above 18 knots do not 
improve the submarine's probability of survival. The conclusion is that the submarine's 
maximum speed affects its evasive performance within a specific range. Although the 
model simulated shows improvements only in the range between 12 and 18 knots, a real 
system might exhibit improvements across a different range. 
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The estimated equation found in the previous chapter (ref page 42), expresses the 
characteristics of the simulation, which is only a model of reality. The data for the model 
come from open sources and so the particular numbers do not necessarily represent the 
behavior of actual submarines and torpedoes. However, the shape of the curve is likely to 
be realistic. 
With respect to probability of survival while evading a light ASW torpedo, the 
maximum submarine speed providing the greatest probability of survival (0.435) is 18 
knots. The model is based on assumptions that might make the results more favorable for 
the modeled submarine than in a real life situation. This study suggests at least a 
maximum speed of 18 knots with higher speed capability recommended, and points out 
that interpretations of the survival curve in the range around 18 knots must be made with 
care. Again, a real system not operating under the same assumptions as this model might 
show different probabilities of survival at different speeds. 
It should be kept in mind that these results come from an experiment where the 
torpedo is dropped at a distance from the submarine of approximately 1400 meters. 
When dropped at the closest distance (500 meters) the modeled submarine had a 
probability of survival of zero, regardless of its maximum speed. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
Changes in the assumptions of the model may change the shape or range of the 
probability of survival curve and the conclusions regarding maximum speed. From this 
study, there is some reason to believe that changes in the initial speed of the submarine in 
particular could lead to changes in the submarine's probability of survival. These issues 
bear for further investigation. 
The upper flat part of this model's survival curve (between 18 and 30 knots) 
should also be investigated further. Is it true that a submarine with a maximum speed of 
30 knots does not survive any better than a submarine with a maximum speed of 18 
knots? One way to investigate this question might be to choose an MOE that focuses on 
the submarines that are killed, but emphasizes the length of time before it is killed. 
Models with different maximum speeds can, as this thesis shows, have the same 
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probability of survival. A question to ask would be, for the submarines that were killed, 
are the times to kill equal for submarines with different maximum speeds? If not then 
perhaps higher maximum speed gives the submarine more time to execute new or other 
types of evasive actions and to survive. 
This work can also be extended to further investigate countermeasure systems. Is 
the configuration of one decoy and four jammers a good configuration? Are there other 
more efficient ways to deploy each of the elements of the countermeasure system 
geometrically around the submarine? This thesis partially answers some questions but 
suggests many others deserving further investigation. 
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